












































































































European Neighbourhood Policy Package 
– Conclusions for the Eastern Partners
Rafał Sadowski
In 2011 the European Union began a process aimed at reforming its policy 
on the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood. The change in circumstances 
in neighbouring countries following the Arab Spring, along with the lack of 
significant progress regarding Eastern Europe’s integration with the EU, 
formed the main driving force behind this process. The prime objective of 
the changes to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was the need to 
introduce new incentives for partner countries to modernise and integrate 
more closely with the EU Another aim was to increase the flexibility of 
EU instruments (by adapting them to the specific context of each partner 
state). One year later, on 15 May 2012, the European Commission and the 
EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy published 
the European Neighbourhood Policy Package which reported on the pro-
gress made in the implementation of the ENP over the preceding year and 
set out the aims and Action Plans for 20131.
An analysis of the outcomes of changes made to the EU policy towards 
Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus suggests that the aim of the re-
vision was aimed more at addressing the changing political landscape in 
the region rather than at the implementation of a substantial reform of 
the neighbourhood policy. The ENP is largely based on bureaucratic pro-
cedures (the negotiation of bilateral agreements, the implementation of 
support programmes). These have only a limited capacity to bring about 
lasting change in the region, as has been exemplified by the deterioration 
of democratic standards in a number of countries; this was highlighted in 
EU’s own reports. This problem is particularly clear in the case of Ukraine; 
until recently it was seen as the leader of European integration but is now 
raising much concern due to a deterioration in the state of democracy there.
EU instruments have a limited influence on the situation in Eastern Part-
nership countries and the region’s significance on the EU’s agenda is fall-
ing (the priority is now given to counteracting the economic crisis, and 
prominence in the neighbourhood policy has been given to the Southern 
Mediterranean). In response to this EU policy on Eastern Europe will focus 
to a larger extent on technical and sectoral cooperation.
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Eastern	 Europe),	 which	 set	 themselves	
different	 goals	 in	 their	 cooperation	 with	
the	 EU	 (Moldova,	 for	 instance,	 is	 inter-
ested	 in	 closer	 integration,	while	Belarus	
wants	 to	 focus	 on	 developing	 trade	 links	
without	political	integration	with	the	EU).
2.	 The	 ‘more	 for	 more’	 principle	 rewards	 partner	 countries	 with	 greater	 support	 from	













The changes, rolled out in 2011, 
have had a greater impact on 
the EU’s policy towards the South 
than towards the East.




had	been	tarnished	by	the	revolutions	 in	 the	Southern	Neighbourhood,	which	called	 into	











The	 increase	 in	 the	 EU’s	 financial	 support	 was	 greater	 for	 the	 South	 than	 for	 the	 East	
in	2011(see	Appendix,	Table	3).	
Integration between the EU and its Eastern Neighbourhood 
The	ENP	Package,	unveiled	on	15	May	2012	by	 the	European	Commission	and	 the	EU	
High	Representative	for	Foreign	Affairs	and	Security	Policy,	contains	documents	reviewing	






In	 its	country	Progress	Reports,	assessing	progress	 in	European	 integration,	 the	Europe-
an	Commission	 identified	Moldova	as	 the	best	performer	among	 its	eastern	neighbours.	
The	country	has	made	significant	progress	
in	negotiating	bilateral	agreements	(an	As-
sociation	 Agreement,	 a	 Deep	 and	 Com-
prehensive	 Free	 Trade	 agreement,	 and	





































Despite progress in integration 
and the development of bi- and 
multilateral cooperation, the EU has 
noted a deterioration in respect for 
democratic standards, human rights, 
and the rule of law.





agreements,	pointing	 to	 the	 launch	of	negotiations	on	 the	DCFTA,	and	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
launch	of	visa	dialogue	 is	about	 to	start	 (these	aim	to	define	 the	conditions	 for	visa-free	






recommended	changes	 to	 the	 labour	 law.	






nomic	 reforms	 implemented	 by	 the	 Ar-
menian	 government	 have	 been	 assessed	
rather	 positively.	 The	 EU’s	 objections	 fo-
cused	on	media	freedom	and	the	freedom	








No	 tangible	progress	was	observed in Azerbaijan’s attempts	 to	negotiate	 an	association	
agreement	or	to	 implement	agreed	Action	Plans	and	so	this	country	remains	–	alongside	
Belarus	–	 the	 least	engaged	partner	within	 the	EaP.	Positive	comments	were	made	only	
with	 regard	 to	 the	 growing	 cooperation	 in	 the	 energy	 sector	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	
the	Southern	Gas	Corridor,	which	has	become	the	main	area	of	cooperation	between	the	









ment	 is	not	 interested	 in	European	 integration,	and	has	previously	 rejected	an	 invitation	
from	the	EU	 to	 launch	negotiations	on	visa	 facilitation	and	 readmission.	The	main	 focus	
of	 the	EU	report	 is	criticism	of	 the	significant	deterioration	of	human	rights	and	 the	 rule	
of	 law	 in	Belarus.	As	a	 result,	 the	EU	 introduced	visa	 sanctions	and	 froze	 the	bank	ac-
counts	of	243	people	responsible	for	persecution	of	the	opposition.	It	also	froze	the	assets	
The adoption of new guiding principles 
and changes to the instruments 
of the neighbourhood policy are a step 
in the right direction. Unfortunately, 
the changes are not comprehensive 
enough to fully address the complexity 
of the present challenges and have 
been implemented too slowly 
to keep up with the dynamics of 
an ever-changing context.









Barriers to the implementation of the neighbourhood policy 
The	adoption	of	new	guiding	principles	and	changes	to	the	instruments	of	the	neighbour-
hood	policy	are	a	step	in	the	right	direction.	Furthermore,	they	will	most	likely	contribute	
to	measures	 taken	by	 the	EU	having	a	greater	effectiveness.	Unfortunately,	 the	changes	
are	not	comprehensive	enough	to	fully	ad-
dress	the	complexity	of	the	present	chal-
lenges	 and	 have	 been	 implemented	 too	
slowly	 to	 keep	 up	 with	 the	 dynamics	 of	
























•	 There	 is	a	clear	 tendency	within	 the	EU	to	draw	out	bureaucratic	procedures.	This	 is	
coupled	with	a	lack	of	political	will	to	make	binding	decisions	which	lead	towards	closer	
integration.	This	is	exemplified	by,	for	instance,	the	negotiations	an	action	plan	on	visa	
facilitation,	 currently	being	undertaken	by	Ukraine	and	Moldova.	Under	 current	 rules,	
meeting	all	of	the	conditions	stipulated	by	the	EU	does	not	automatically	translate	into	
the	introduction	of	visa-free	travel	since	this	ultimately	depends	on	a	political	decision	
being	made	 by	 EU	member	 states.	 Consequently,	 the	 unpredictability	 of	 the	 system	
weakens	the	engagement	of	partner	countries	in	their	efforts	to	implement	reforms.
The ENP is likely to focus on coopera-
tion at a technical and sectoral level 
in selected areas of mutual interest. 
































Table 1. Current state of negotiations on Association Agreements with Eastern Partnership countries
Association Agreement  (AA)4 Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Agreement (DCFTA)
Outlook for the negotiations 
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Table 2. Current state of negotiations on Visa Facilitation Agreements with European Partnership 
countries
Visa Facilitation and 
Readmission Agreement 


































Table 3. Additional EU funds earmarked for ENP in 2011 (in EUR)
Eastern Neighbourhood Southern Neighbourhood
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Translation: Maciej Kędzierski 
Cooperation: Nicholas Furnival 
DTP: Wojciech Mańkowski
The Centre for Eastern Studies (CES) was established in 1990. CES is financed from the budget. 
The Centre monitors and analyses the political, economic and social situation in Russia, Central 
and Eastern European countries, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Central Asia. 
CES focuses on the key political, economic and security issues, such as internal situations 
and stability of the mentioned countries, the systems of power, relations between political 
centres, foreign policies, issues related to NATO and EU enlargement, energy supply security, 
existing and potential conflicts, among other issues. 
The views expressed by the authors of the papers do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities. 






































































































































































































































































































































5.5 6.0 6.0 3.5
6	 https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2011
7	 http://cpi.transparency.org
8	 http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
9	 http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports
10	 For	Gaza	and	the	West	Bank,	respectively.
